F35051 — TM54F: Defect in a monitoring channel

F35051 is reported by the TM54F when the data cross check between its two control channels detects a mismatch. According to the manual this can simply be incorrect parameterization, but the Safety Integrated software may also have identified a genuine defect, for example defective hardware — the remedy sequence is written specifically to rule that out. While the fault is present, the fail-safe input terminal signals are transferred to the motion monitoring functions.

• The two control channels of the TM54F compared the same safety data and arrived at different results.
• The Safety Integrated parameterization of the module can be incorrect, so the TM54F master and the TM54F slave hold different data.
• The Safety Integrated software may have identified an actual defect, for example defective hardware.
• An internal software error in the TM54F is indicated by a value greater than zero in the aaaa part of the fault value.

1. Read the fault value in r0949 and determine from bb which data failed the cross comparison.
2. Check the parameters named by the fault value for incorrect parameterization; each named parameter must have the same value in the TM54F master and in the TM54F slave.
3. Enter the safety commissioning mode (p0010 = 95).
4. Start the copy function for the SI parameters (p9700 = 57 hex).
5. Acknowledge the complete data change (p9701 = AC hex).
6. Leave the safety commissioning mode (p0010 = 0).
7. Save all parameters (p0977 = 1).
8. Carry out the safe acknowledgment via p10006.

If the aaaa part of the fault value is greater than zero, it is an internal software error: upgrade the TM54F firmware to a later version, contact Technical Support and replace the TM54F.

The drive stores the fault value in r0949; interpret it hexadecimal. It has the structure aaaabbcc:

• aaaa — a value greater than zero indicates an internal software error; the checks then follow the firmware upgrade path.
• bb — the data that was cross-compared when the mismatch occurred. Where bb names parameters, the TM54F master and the TM54F slave must carry the same value for each one. Single values each name one safety parameter, for example bb = 00 hex: p10000[0], bb = 04 hex: p10008, bb = 07 hex: p10020, bb = 09 hex: p10022, bb = 15 hex: p10041, bb = 19 hex: p10045; the manual maps every remaining value in the same way.
• bb = BE, BF, C0 hex — the debounce times held in p10017: for the failsafe inputs (F-DI), the single-channel inputs (DI) and the Diag inputs.
• bb = C1 ... CA hex — an internal data error concerning the SDI terminals p10030 (positive) and p10031 (negative) and the data used to calculate the drive groups from them.
• bb = CB ... D5 hex — the SLP data: p10032, p10033 and p10009 individually, then the SLP parameters p10032 ... p10033 broken down per drive group 1 to 4.
• bb = D6 ... D8 hex — the retract function (initialization and SLP) and the parameter p10000[1...5].
• bb = D9 ... F2 hex — faulty internal data, in the axis communication (D9 ... E3) and in the discrepancy check (E4 ... F2).
• cc — the index of the data that failed the comparison.

• r0949 — read the fault value here and interpret it hexadecimal as aaaabbcc.
• p0010 — the drive commissioning parameter filter; set to 95 for the safety commissioning mode, back to 0 to exit.
• p9700 — set to 57 hex to start the copy function for the SI parameters.
• p9701 — set to AC hex to acknowledge the complete SI motion data change.
• p0977 — set to 1 to save all parameters.
• p10006 — here the safe acknowledgment for the fault is carried out; bb = 03 hex points to this parameter.
• p10000 — TM54F communication clock cycle; compared as p10000[0] (bb = 00 hex) and as p10000[1...5] (bb = D8 hex).
• p10017 — debounce time of the digital inputs; the F-DI, DI and Diag debounce times checked under bb = BE, BF, C0 hex sit here.
• p10030 / p10031 — SDI positive / negative input terminals, named under bb = C1 ... CA hex.
• p10032 / p10033 / p10009 — SLP select and position range input terminals and the SLP retraction F-DI, named under bb = CB ... D5 hex.

Acknowledge the fault message without delay once the remedy steps are complete. The Safety Integrated acknowledgment itself is the safe acknowledgment carried out via p10006, the final step of the remedy sequence.